Iuspositivismo, objetivismo moral y Estado constitucional

  1. García Amado, Juan Antonio
Journal:
Anales de la Cátedra Francisco Suárez

ISSN: 0008-7750

Year of publication: 2022

Issue Title: Positivismo jurídico: retos y alternativas

Issue: 56

Pages: 7-31

Type: Article

DOI: 10.30827/ACFS.V56I.21658 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openOpen access editor

More publications in: Anales de la Cátedra Francisco Suárez

Metrics

Cited by

  • Scopus Cited by: 0 (21-01-2024)
  • Dimensions Cited by: 0 (15-01-2024)

Índice Dialnet de Revistas

  • Year 2022
  • Journal Impact: 0.300
  • Field: DERECHO Quartile: C1 Rank in field: 72/366
  • Field: FILOSOFÍA DEL DERECHO Quartile: C1 Rank in field: 4/19
  • Field: DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL Y POLÍTICO Quartile: C2 Rank in field: 9/23

CIRC

  • Social Sciences: B
  • Human Sciences: C

Scopus CiteScore

  • Year 2022
  • CiteScore of the Journal : 0.4
  • Area: Law Percentile: 27

Dimensions

(Data updated as of 15-01-2024)
  • Total citations: 0
  • Recent citations (2 years): 0
  • Field Citation Ratio (FCR): 0.0

Abstract

A legal moralist theory of law cannot but be based on moral objectivism, while a legal positivist theory can be defended equally by objectivists and non-objectivists. The consequences that legal moralism has for the theory of the validity of legal norms and for their applicability in concrete cases are examined, and the asymmetries and aporias to which a moralist theory of law leads are surveyed. Finally, it is emphasized that legal moralists radically disagree on the contents of true morality and just law and that only a legal positivist approach is compatible with the constitutional and democratic rule of law.

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