Answers to Spanish centrifugal federalismAsymmetrical federalism versus coercive federalism

  1. Esther Seijas Villadangos
Revista:
Perspectives on Federalism

ISSN: 2036-5438

Año de publicación: 2014

Volumen: 6

Número: 2

Páginas: 9

Tipo: Artículo

Otras publicaciones en: Perspectives on Federalism

Resumen

The developing debate in Spain about its conversion into a federal State has now acquired an even greater relevance. Federalism, as a process of federalization, is subject to several descriptions with different intentions: the federalization of Spain implies a previous transition to federalism from a virtual field to a real field. We will review the main features in this transition. Post-conversion, we consider that there are two basic opposite alternatives: asymmetrical federalism and coercive federalism. In our discourse about how asymmetrical federalism could be implemented in Spain we will focus on the risk of the evolution of asymmetries into dissymmetries, which we understand as a proportional situation that is broken in an anomalous way mainly with pro secession arguments or by other threats. Differential facts would be the headquarters of this asymmetric federal company. From a different point of view, the path of coercive federalism might come from both the rejection by other territories of privileges, as a specific perception of asymmetries, and as the central answer to a proposal of self-determination or institutional disobedience. Our main thesis is that a balanced proposal of democratic asymmetrical federalism is possible where differences can be seen as enriching the whole.